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The Chinese list companies’ non-tradable equity reform is a milestone-event in the 
capital market history. Within the non-tradable equity reform process, there appears three 
special characteristics: First is the local authorities and the national capital committees 
are actively performing the influence; Secondly is that non-tradable equity reform 
executed set by set - from few companies to a big range of companies; Thirdly the non 
tradable equity shareholders make the compensation plan first, and then the tradable 
equity shareholders vote on the plan instead of two parties jointly making the 
compensation plan at the same time. 
In the reform, the local authorities and the national capital committee’s active 
involvement may result in a deviation of the shareholder-right from Pareto optimization. 
A set-by-set process has made the early announced compensation plans become models 
for the later reforming companies. The model pressure possibly will influence the 
non-tradable equity shareholders’ negotiation power and the tradable equity shareholders’ 
negotiation power respectively. On average the non-tradable equity shareholders make 
the compensation plan one month before the shareholders’ meeting. In this period, more 
companies’ compensation plans come out with reference to the early companies, these 
new compensation plans will then re-influence the early companies tradable equity 
shareholders voting psychologically. 
So many facts prove that the specific of non-tradable equity reform process 
determine that the influences on the non-tradable equity shareholders and tradable equity 
shareholders are out of ratio and the negotiation power is gradually more favorable to 
non-tradable equity shareholders. So it looks like the process of the reform is a two-party 
game between the non-tradable equity shareholders and the tradable equity shareholders, 
but in fact, it is a decision-making process completely managed by the non-tradable 
equity shareholders. In the series of the decision-making, the tradable equity shareholders 
could not play their roles as they should, and the reform becomes a pseudo-player game 
where the interaction for the parties are among the tradable equity shareholders from 
different companies. So we would like to study the compensation decision-making 













including learning theory and herding theory. 
There are three noticeable characteristics during the non-tradable equity reform: the 
compensation ratio has an obvious clustering characteristic; the compensation ratio 
decreases gradually; and the 4-year bear market ended and the bull market begins. So can 
learning explain the compensation ratio’s decrease trend? Is the compensation ratio 
cluster come out of learning-convergence or herding? Why do the companies herd? Will 
the stock market influences the compensation-ratio decision? The market change is more 
favorable to which one, the non-tradable equity shareholders or the tradable equity 
shareholders? Is the compensation ratio’s clustering characteristics also playing a role 
here? 
Through analysis on the compensation decision-making process, we sets the 
pseudo-player game hypothesis for the non-tradable equity reform. Based on 
psychological, economic and financial theories, we establish the theory frame of learning 
and herding, and then provide proofs of “learning hypothesis” and “herding hypothesis” 
for the non-tradable equity reform, using the data of non-special treatment companies 
listed in Shanghai stock market and Shenzhen stock market as samples. We compare and 
analyze learning, including best-response learning and imitation learning, and herding 
and its internal and external influencing factors, such as the company’s characteristics, 
the stock price over-valued, the reform stage and the participants’ quantity. The empirical 
research provides evidences for learning and herding hypothesis. 
Theoretically learning means that in the observable environment, by means of 
analyzing individual’s experience, environmental structure or other people’s behavior or 
outcome, people improve their own decision information and then the decision utility. 
Learning roots in information asymmetry and human being’s limited rationality. While 
herding means in order to improve decision utility, such as making right decisions, 
acquiring selfish interest etc., decision makers give up private information, and imitate 
previous people or follow the group’s actions. Herding derives from information 
asymmetry, social norm or principal-agent problem.  
The correlation and difference between learning and herding are as: both of learning 
and the herding theory study group decision and behavior, and pay attention to the 













Herding always initially come from learning incentive, while learning catabolizes 
gradually as herding-behavior. Social learning improves the public information pool via 
group interaction to spread private information to all decision makers. On the contrary, 
herding deletes or weakens private information and finally prevents the public 
information poll from growing. 
Emerged in empirical outcome, learning may makes the group behavior converge or 
diverge. If convergence arises, and the learning chain is long enough, the convergency 
value is close to the truth. Herding must make the group behavior converge while it does 
not get close to truth. Under the informational mechanism, learning improves decision 
quality step by step, so the group utility increases gradually. While herding makes the 
decision quality worse, so the group utility decreases gradually (under the agent 
mechanism, individual utility might get improved by herding). 
By establishing a theoretic learning model of the non-tradable equity reform, we 
analyze out that in the serial, repetitive and complex process, there exits imitative 
learning and also optimum-response learning. The optimum-response learning includes 
not only reinforcement-based learning - through observation to reinforcement the early 
actor’s strategy attraction but also belief-based learning - through observation to change 
personal belief. 
The empirical study provides evidence for the theoretic analysis. in empirical study, 
we found that in the process of the non-tradable equity reform, there exists a symbiosis of 
optimum-response learning and imitative learning. The optimum-response learning 
explains the decreasing trend of compensation ratio. As for the imitative learning, in time 
series, it makes the reforming companies in neighboring set present stickiness in 
compensation ratios which brings partially the compensation ratio’s a cross-sectional 
clustering effect in the next set. However, the stickiness accumulation does not impact 
the compensation ratio’s decreasing trend, so cascades do not happen. 
Our empirical study also find that if the non-tradable equity ratio is smaller, the 
companies earning is better, the institutional investors’ shareholding is higher, the added 
commitment in the compensation plan is stronger, or the stock price is higher (relative to 
EPS), the non-tradable equity shareholders will pay less compensation. Obviously, when 













shareholders - they successfully made the compensation ratio lower so they get more 
benefit. Another interesting thing is that, being as the biggest tradable equity 
shareholders,  the institutional investors have not bargained a higher compensation ratio, 
on the contrast, they played the opposite role – the more their shareholdings, the less the 
compensation ratio. 
We also analyzed herding behavior in the non-tradable equity reform process with 
theoretical model and empirical research. By establishing theoretical model, we draw the 
following conclusions: the economic environment, industry competition, decision 
makers’ rationality and other factors will influence the decision quality; decision makers 
have herding incentive to get more information or psychological support. In the group of 
competition if the project asset value is overvalued by the stock market, herding will 
always happen. If the asset value is undervalued in the stock market, the decision makers 
will become more conservative, there may not herd. Decision makers’ attention to the 
project risks and the precise budget for the project will reduce the probability of herding. 
Through the empirical research on herding of the non-tradable equity reform, we 
found that:  
(1) There is no herding in time series in the non-tradable equity reform. But in the 
cross section, in addition to the compensation ratio cluster induced by learning, there also 
exits herding in the compensation decision-making. It shows that when deciding how 
much to compensate, the decision makers not only learn from prior companies’ decision 
method, but also imitate with each other in the same set. Besides, they also consider the 
company’s profitability, non tradable equity ratio, institutional shareholdings ratio and 
the additional commitment in the compensation and the like. The company size and the 
stock price-increase are not considerable; they may get implicit in learning or herding. 
(2) The political meddling in non-tradable equity reform restricts the decision 
makers’ choices space and independence, so there is nearly no way for them to be free 
from herding in the compensation decision process. It stands to reason that it also 
distorted the relationship between decision-making herding and the capital asset valuing.  
(3) Those companies with higher profitability provide lower compensation ratio and 
are more incline to adopt herding. It means that they are trying to reduce the 













Adopting herding in the compensation decision process can help to strengthen the 
tradable equity shareholders’ mental pressure and weaken their negotiation power. On the 
other hand, those companies with lower profitability are more conservative in the 
decision in view of their higher risk. The non-tradable share ratio does not significantly 
influence herding. This maybe because the average level of non-tradable share ratio is 
high enough; the equity reform will not threaten the big shareholder’s control on 
company. The more the public company’s debt, the less herding will be in the 
compensation decision.  
(4) Herding in the compensation ratio decision is negatively correlated to the 
numbers of companies in each set. It shows that when there is no competition and the 
group size is big enough, herding will be weakened.  
(5) As the reform going on, herding becomes stronger and stronger. Considering the 
phenomenon of “as the reform going on, the compensation ratio gets lower and lower”, 
herding presents its strategic effect: to adopt herding help to strengthen the tradable 
equity shareholders’ mental pressure and weaken their negotiation power, it will make 
the tradable equity shareholders more maneuverable to accept the lower compensation 
ratio.  As the non-tradable equity reform progresses, the pubic companies’ 
acknowledgement of herding effects spreads out.  
There exits informational asymmetry in the non-tradable equity reform. Besides, 
there also exits agent problems between national power and investors, major shareholders 
and small shareholders, principals and agents (especially in the governance of 
institutional investors). Under the agent mechanism, where herding acts as a strategy 
which can be independent of learning, the strategic herding behavior will help strengthen 
the non-tradable equity shareholders’ negotiation power and strengthen the tradable 
equity shareholders’ mental pressure, so reduce the compensation ratio or make it easier 
for the tradable equity shareholders to accept the compensation plan. So herding and 
learning are both creating “benefit” in the process of non-tradable equity reform. 
Comparing to the previous studies, this paper provide a brand new study view and 
method. First of all, using the pseudo-player game theory as the framework is what 
makes this paper different from other papers that study on non-tradable equity reform. It 













Secondly the theme of this paper is to use the non-tradable equity reform as samples 
to study the interaction of environment, incentive and actions in behavioral corporate 
finance. While previous studies on companies strategy decision is usually limited to an 
analysis of the companies characteristics’ effect on the decision-making, which neglect 
the environment and consider the decision process a static, monotonous process. 
Thirdly the research paradigm stands on behaviorism and generic conditions: 
incomplete information, incomplete market and limited rationality. But previous studies 
on learning usually suppose a perfect market being limited to their samples. 
Fourthly the analyzing method is not limited to the current literatures, but on the 
basis of behaviorism, with reference to social psychology, behavioral game theory. This 
paper uses inference, theoretical model, data analysis and empirical verification to ensure 
the study is scientific, objective and precise. 
Fifthly, it is the first time to do a theoretical and empirical study of learning and 
herding on the non-tradable equity reform. This paper is also the first one to do a 
theoretical and empirical study on the influence factors of herding, and the first one to 
give a comparative analysis of learning and herding. It extends the theoretical and 
empirical study about learning in corporate finance, and provides additional academic 
evidence to comprehensively evaluate Chinese non-tradable equity reform. 
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